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With the majority of the world’s countries depending upon water originating outside 
of their national borders (Wolf et al., 1999) withdrawals from one country can drain 
life-giving water from a neighbouring country and as such become an apparent source 
of interstate conflict (Homer-Dixon, 1999; Toset et al., 2000). Since transboundary 
watersheds traverse political, legal and administrative boundaries, heterogeneous and 
sometimes conflicting national laws and regulations turn its governance into a 
challenge for policymakers, which is further aggravated by the fact that no state or 
supranational agency has authority over the other (Cooley et al., 2009). 
In addition, water qualifies as a common-pool resource
2
 that is partially excludable 
and rival, meaning that the consumption of one unit by one inevitably excludes 
simultaneous consumption of that unit by others (Hardin, 1968:19; Ostrom, 1990:30). 
This poses some unique collective action problems (Taylor, 1987:3), including issues 
related to congestion, overuse and depletion of the resource. Yet, while intensified 
and diversified demand will increase rivalry over shared waters (Yoffe et al., 1993; 
UNDP, 2006; Bernauer and Kalbhenn, 2010), growing pressure on the supply-side
3
 is 
                                                
2
 The term “common-pool resource” refers to a natural or man-made resource system that is 
sufficiently large as to make it costly (but not impossible) to exclude potential beneficiaries from 
obtaining benefits from its use (Ostrom, 1990:30).  
3
 Pressure is expected to intensify due to the fact that diverse demands (domestic, agricultural, 
industrial, recreational) must be met from constantly fluctuating resources, while unsustainable water 
management practices (Bernauer and Kalbhenn, 2010) changing environmental conditions (Eea, 2007; 
IPCC, 2007; IWMI, 2006; UNDP, 2006; TEC, 2007; World Bank, 2009) and new water uses and 
allocation patterns continuously challenge the existing water supply. 
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most likely to boost policymakers’ incentives to formulate shared rules and 
agreements for such managing transboundary resources (Benvenisti, 2002:42).  
 
Currently international agreements are the strongest existing tools available for 
individual states to manage common waters. The FAO index of water agreements 
indicates that countries in the past already resorted to treaties in an attempt to address 
uncertainty about the value and utilization of shared resources (Ohlsson, 1995; 
Vinogradov et al., 2003; Bernauer, 2002; Espey and Towfique, 2004; Bernauer & 
Kalbhenn, 2010). The agreements listed there may be either watercourse specific (e.g. 
the 1961 Columbia River Treaty) or an umbrella agreement regulating regional waters 
(e.g. 1992 Helsinki Convention on Transboundary Watercourses)  (Vinogradov et al., 
2003). But at the same new disputes are arising and new forms and arrangements for 
these agreements are becoming a necessity (Cooley et al., 2009). Transboundary 
agreements may form the basis for an initial watercourse regime, but conditions and 
priorities within a basin can change over time, creating a state of continuous 
uncertainty (UNEP, 2002). If treaties are inept to address these uncertainties and lack 
flexibility to accommodate changing preferences and incentives, issues of treaty 
implementation may become important obstacles to cooperation and might even force 
countries to deviate from an agreement after it is in place (Bhaduri, 2006), eventually 
stimulating the risk to conflict (IPCC, 2001; Bernauer & Kalbhenn, 2010).  
 
It has been long recognized that mechanisms for conflict resolution are growingly 
important elements to water agreements because of their ability to address future 
uncertainty, enhance flexibility, enforce treaty commitments and mitigate potential 
disputes as resource availability changes (Smith, 2000; Fischhendler, 2004; Wolf, 
2007). As early as 1931, Herbert Arthur Smith already identified the main problem 
presented by the development and exploitation of international water resources to be 
the establishment of authorities able to settle disputes (Smith, 1931:120)
4
. Yet, there 
is no general rule of law which can be applied to all disputes that may arise under an 
agreement (Smith, 1931:87) and although useful as a background for a number of 
transboundary water treaties, broad international guidelines such as the Helsinki and 
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 At that time, the interstate disputes that reached legal or negotiated settlements reflected mainly 
economic interests
4
 while currently they concern issues of human subsistence and the provision of 
basic human needs and rights (Benvenisti, 2002: 179). 
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the Berlin rules tend to provide little specific guidance in case of dispute arousal and 
often lack enforceable principles to resolve conflicts between riparian states 
(Frederiksen, 1992; Benvenisti, 1996; Wolf, 1997; Bernauer, 2002; Brochmann & 
Gleditsch, 2006). Despite repeated demands for the development of more detailed 
conflict resolution procedures
5
, little progress has been made so far (Cooley et al., 
2009) and CRM in transboundary water agreements is either absent or unsophisticated 
(Goldenman, 1990; Fischhendler, 2004; Boockmann & Thurner 2006; Cooley et al., 
2009). In their study of 1998 Hamner and Wolf found that 22 % of all scrutinised 
treaties
6
 lacked any provision for conflict resolution, while 32 % of the treaties are 
either incomplete or uncertain as to the creation of dispute resolution mechanisms.  
 
This gap between the demand for available CRM and their actual appearance in 
agreements brings us to the assumption that CRM-adoption comes at a significant 
cost. The more, since different mechanisms appear to be adopted in different 
circumstances we assume that costs may vary depending on external conditions. It is 
the transaction cost (TC) paradigm that is particularly functional as a framework for 
analysing what affects decision-making in the case of CRM, hence for examining how 
parties decide on the choice for a particular mechanism. This approach assumes that 
parties weigh the benefits and costs of entering an agreement and would therefore 
search for the appropriate structure and arrangements, which minimize the cost of 
their participation in the treaty (Boadu, 1998). The field of international relations has 
barely scratched the surface in testing the implications of the transaction costs 
approach to international cooperation and there are numerous environmental 
agreements of which the institutional characteristics have gone unstudied under this 
approach (Gilligan, 2003). In the context of international treaties transaction costs are 
composed of political costs and monitoring and enforcement costs, which will be 
discussed more in detail in the section 5 of this paper. In both cases parties will seek 
to adopt a CRM (or series of CRM) that addresses these two types of costs, while 
trying to maximize the benefits of the CRM adopted. Hence, the underlying 
assumption of our study is that conflict resolution mechanisms differ in both costs and 
effectiveness to address such costs. Throughout our study we examine what can bring 
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 Smith, 1931; Caldwell, 1984; Hayton & Utton, 1989; UNEP, 2002 
6
 Hamner and Wolf examined the treaties present in the Transboundary Freshwater Database (TFDD), 
Oregon State University. 
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about these costs in reality. Based on a broad conceptual framework and a reading of 
the literature we therefore develop a series of hypotheses about how the TC-pattern is 
expected to influence the adoption of CRM. Data obtained from a large number of 
transboundary water treaties will eventually allow us to carry out a multivariate 
analysis and verify these expectancies.  
 
Notwithstanding the fact that water is our case study, it is important to stress that the 
same regulatory problems apply to other transboundary and common-pool resources, 
such as forests, fisheries or clean air. Eventually policy-making issues are alike for all 
environmental resources “to which no single decision-making unit holds exclusive 
title” (Wijkman, 1982:512), which means they are the property of no one and 
accessible to everyone7. However, at the same time these resources are privately 
appropriable and subtractable (Ostrom, 1990:30), a characteristic that makes them 
especially vulnerable for human overuse or depletion (Benvenisti, 2002)8. Currently, a 
number of regimes and international agreements are in place to protect and govern the 
use of these resources while aiming to regulate conflicting demands of sovereign states 
(Young, 1989; Barrett, 2003). Yet, while such agreements are literally covering every 
transnational and environmental issue of our time, their norms and principles do not 
exist in a vacuum (Vogler, 1995). Every treaty is unique in the sense that it constitutes 
a specific remedy to a specific transborder externality, but all are designed and 
implemented under conditions of uncertainty and all share certain common features, of 
which conflict resolution is an essential one (Barrett, 2003). Through our 
understanding of what affects the use of conflict resolution in transboundary water 
agreements we therefore aim to draw valuable lessons regarding the challenges policy 
makers face in other fields of environmental policy as well.  
 
The following sections will illustrate the methodology and conceptual framework of 
this study more in detail. Section 2 lines out the methodology of our research while 
section 3 offers a complete overview of the different CRM available. It mainly allows 
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 Therefore also often referred to as open-access resources (Ostrom, 1990:30) 
8
 This is generally referred to the tragedy of the commons (Hardin, 1982) 
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us to distinguish four main categories for conflict resolution including negotiation, 
mediation, arbitration and adjudication. It also discusses their main characteristics and 
benefits. Section 4 captures the dependent variables in the form of CRM properties 
and variance. As with section 3, this part also concludes with a summarising table 
(table 1 and 2). The independent variables list a host of attributes, which are either 
related to the resource, the riparian or the treaty itself. They are further discussed from 
a transaction costs approach and presented as the indicators that influence the TC 
(section 5). The different costs include political costs and monitoring and enforcement 
costs while the indicators consist of a series of economic, political and physical 
variables. At the end of this section a conceptual model (figure 1) summarises the 
different cost types, the proxies to assess them and their expected influence on CRM-
adoption. For a more detailed overview of the indicators used and how to measure 
them, we refer to the codebook in annex (1). Finally, section 7 and 8 will present and 




To ascertain if and how transboundary water treaties address the risk to conflict, a 
content analysis of the available transboundary water treaties was undertaken.  The 
unit of analysis is the treaty9 for which the most comprehensive source is the recently 
expanded Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database (TFDD), listing a total of 679 
agreements. Treaty content will be read and analyzed, first for reference to conflict 
resolution, second for the type of mechanism used. We will also look at an additional 
number of dependent variables relating to the appearance of CRM in water treaties. In 
a first stage of our research we conducted a pilot study, based on the data of 100 
randomly selected treaties, exclusively primary agreements of which substantial text 
is available and which are written or translated into English or French
10
. In order to 
group treaty texts according to lineage, primary agreements also include substitutes of 
former (primary) agreements, exchange of notes, conventions and protocols to 
agreements. The first agreement in the sample dates from 1857 while the last was 
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 Defined in accordance with the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties of 1969 as “an 
international agreement concluded between states in written form and governed by 
international law, whether embodied in a single instrument of in two or more related 
instruments and whatever its particular designation” (Vienna Convention, 1969, Art.2). 
10
 With two or three exceptions of treaties in Italian and Dutch 
 7 
signed in 2004. In correspondence with an earlier distinction of Hamner and Wolf 
(1998:158) we included only treaties that governed transboundary waters (aquifers, 
rivers or lakes) and considered water as “a scarce or consumable resource, a quantity 
to be managed or an ecosystem to be improved or maintained” (Hamner and Wolf, 
1998:158). Hence, we left out treaties dealing navigation and fishery issues as well as 
broad conventions, such as the UN Convention on the Law of Non-navigational Uses 
of International Watercourses, which line out principles for water governance but do 
not apply these principles to actual water bodies.  
 
After some practical adjustments, a second stage will allow us to review the 
remaining and available treaties in the TFDD. To facilitate statistical comparison over 
time, we will select an equal number of treaties for each period for the second part of 
this research (I still don’t know whether this is necessary). The first period will start 
from 1850 and the last will end with the lat treaty registered. A 20-year interval will 
be used to distinguish between the different periods. The updated version of the 
database provides us with 303 agreements that match our criteria. However, two 
factors are expected to slender the quantity of our results. First, for several, mostly 
earlier treaties no data is available for our explanatory variables (indicators). This 
limitation implies that we will not be able to include every single treaty in our results. 
Second, few of the formulated hypotheses assume dyadic relations, which 
unavoidably excludes multilateral agreements from some of the results
11
. The 
following section will further illustrate the conceptual framework of this study.  
 
3. The available CRM types and their potential benefits 
The literature usually identifies four main types of conflict resolution ranging from 
soft law to hard law mechanisms (Wolf, 1997; Foley, 2007; Emerson et al., 2003). 
They include negotiation, mediation, arbitration and adjudication. Each of these 
mechanisms is characterized by a different nature and a distinct role of a third 
party. “Nature” implies that conflict resolution can be either “competitive” and 
rights-based or “cooperative” and interest-based. While the first one is rather 
adversarial while inducing win-lose scenarios, the latter tends to facilitate 
communication while generating win-win outcomes (Deutsch, 1983; Schellenberg, 
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 More details can be found in the codebook, annex 1.  
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1996; Brown&Marriot, 1999; Liebman, 2000; Goldberg, 2003; Spangler, 2003). The 
role of a third party implies the intervention of mediators, joint commissions, 
arbitrators or judicial courts in the process. Along the line of Oran Young’s study 
(1972), we distinguish between “passive and informal” third parties, with limited 
intervening power and “active and formal” third parties, with the authority to issue 
formal statements or impose solutions.  
 
A first type of conflict resolution is negotiation, a process through which disputants 
voluntarily work out an agreement between themselves, while aiming to satisfy the 
interests of each of the factions involved (McCool, 1993; Schellenberg, 1996). 
Negotiation can be direct between parties (consultation) or representative through 
agents or experts (joint commission)
 12
 but it never assumes a third party (Merills, 
1984; Stewart, 1989). Consultation is often an ad hoc procedure, but it can also be 
adopted as a conflict resolution tool in a watercourse agreement (Wouters et al., 
2005). River basin organizations may also have conflict resolution mandates (De 
Stefano et al., 2010), yet, in case a commission takes up a negotiation role it usually 
does not dispose of any formal decision-making power, for in so having, it would be 
assuming an arbitral function (Probst, 1989).  
The adoption of soft law mechanisms such as negotiation and mediation into 
agreements is less costly than integrating hard law rules and regulations, which 
require much more ex ante bargaining of details (Abbot and Snidal, 2000). Yet, while 
negotiation is often the preferred type of CRM when states try to resolve international 
conflict, including those over transboundary water resources (Wouters et al., 2005), in 
many cases the treaty does not specify in which form negotiation should occur. For 
example, the 1994 peace treaty between Israel and Jordan refers to negotiation in case 
a dispute would arise about the application or interpretation of the treaty terms, but 
fails to specify its operational form. Others, such as the 1989 agreement between the 
U.S and Canada concerning water supply and flood control in the Souris River Basin, 
specifically refer to consultation procedures.  
The assumption of negotiation being a low-cost mechanism is mainly due to its 
limited sovereignty costs (Abbot and Snidal, 2000), yet, this type of CRM may not 
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 An example of this from of negotiation is provided by the 1959 agreement between the former 
USSR, Norway and Finland on the regulation of Lake Inari (by means of a hydro-electric power station 
and dam). This agreement refers any disputes that would arise between the different riparians to a 
mixed commission, composed of 6 members (2 representatives per state).  
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always be the most cost-effective way of resolving disputes. For example, one party 
may deny that a conflict exists, advance unreasonable claims or drag its feet, 
eventually inducing a high bargaining cost of the entire conflict resolution process 
(Wouters et al., 2005). In such cases third-party involvement may be a better solution. 
This was the case in a dispute between India and Pakistan over the implementation of 
the Baglihar Hydropower Project, for which construction began in 1999. Pakistan had 
objected several features of the project, stating that it violated the terms of the Indus 
Water Treaty (IWT), to which both countries are party. India refused the objections. 
The Permanent Indus Commission, set up under the IWT with the mandate to settle 
differences between the two riparians in the framework of the treaty, was not able to 
resolve the crisis, ultimately forcing Pakistan to invoke the treaty provision to 
approach the World Bank as a mediator
13
. In conclusion, if negotiations fail or if the 
parties are unable to enter into negotiations altogether, other means of conflict 
resolution are available, and all are based on third-party involvement (Wouters et al., 
2005). The issue of importance here is the actual provision of such additional 
mechanisms by the treaty (if parties failed to incorporate alternative CRM in the 
treaty, they might be more easily forced to treaty violation or renegotiation). 
 
The second mechanism we identify is mediation, which prescribes the intervention of 
an independent third party. Mediation is cooperative in the sense that disputants as 
well as third parties try to look for common grounds and compromising solutions 
together (Young, 1972; Stewart, 1998; Liebman, 2000). According to the authority 
disputants wish to delegate to a third party, we distinguish two operational forms of 
mediation; the practice of good offices, which is hardly interventionist and merely 
offers the disputants a temporary and alternative gateway for communication (Merills, 
1984), and conciliation, which is semi-institutionalised and is a step towards more 
active third-party participation. The latter generally (but not always) assumes the 
assignment of long-term experts or commissions whose intervention is required every 
time a dispute arises (Probst, 1989, Wouters et al., 2005). The 1975 agreement 
between Iran and Iraq on the use of frontier watercourses provides for the good 
offices of a friendly third state in case of dispute while the Columbia River Treaty of 
1961 refers them to an International Joint Commission for decision. Just as 
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 The provision to resort to a “Neutral Expert”, Article IX,  
 10 
negotiation, this is a soft law mechanism, which does not foresee in binding solutions, 
which carries a lower sovereignty cost than other hard law CRM and of which the 
operational form is often left unspecified
14
. Yet, while sovereignty costs might be 
low, monetary costs entailed by some forms of mediation can induce a rise of the TC: 
as many international disputes arise from disagreements on facts, conciliation 
procedures such as fact-finding missions and expert commissions are specifically 
designed to produce a rapid and impartial finding of disputed facts. These procedures 
can be costly in terms of money (full time assignment of experts or commission 
members) but it will frequently resolve a conflict before any binding processes are 
necessary (Wouters et al., 2005), thereby avoiding a sharp rise of the sovereignty 
costs.  
 
Yet, also experienced diplomats and mediators know that even institutionalised best 
efforts to contain disagreement may eventually fail (Hayton & Utton, 1989), creating 
the need for more rigorous and formal conflict resolution procedures such as 
arbitration and adjudication. Arbitration is fundamentally competitive and rights-
based since a third party directly determines the winner and loser in relation to the 
rights and wrongs of a dispute. A decision issued by an arbitrational tribunal can be 
binding if the parties agreed to this. The process contains some of the same elements 
as adjudication but while the latter takes place in an established court, arbitration is a 
more flexible procedure where the parties themselves to set up the machinery for 
handling a dispute or a series of disputes (Merills, 1984; Stewart, 1998, Goldberg et 
al., 2003). Many of the present day watercourse agreements provide for arbitration as 
a means of dispute settlement (Wouters et al., 2005), either as an optional mechanism, 
as a compulsory one (the 1929 Nile treaty or the 1988 Rhine Convention) or as an 
alternative in case other mechanisms fail (the 1994 Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty). 
Yet, traditionally, binding settlement procedures are to be resorted to after all other 
means of dispute resolution have failed (Wouters et al., 2005), mainly because it 
leaves the parties with little intervening authority in the resolution process while 
forcing a high sovereignty cost upon them. From the moment hard law mechanisms 
such as arbitration are in place, they might be useful to decrease ex-post costs, but 
their adoption is more costly than soft law CRM, especially in terms of (ex-ante) 
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 For example, the 1978 treaty of the River Gambia merely states that disputes between the riparians 
should be addressed by mediation, without specifying its from. 
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bargaining (Abbot and Snidal, 2000).  
 
Finally, adjudication or litigation indicates a process where a dispute is settled in 
court, according to legal statutes and with advocates presenting evidence on behalf of 
the parties (Liebman, 2000). It differs from other means of conflict resolution in that 
neither the court nor its rules and procedures are under the discretion of the 
conflicting states (Wouters et al., 2005). It is a hard law mechanism, which is 
ultimately adversarial and rights-based and the decisions of courts are usually binding 
to the parties to the dispute (Stewart, 1998; Spangler, 2003; Chatterjee and 
Lefcovitch, 2008). States can agree by treaty to delegate decision-making power to 
domestic courts, or refer them upon consensus to the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ), the more common practice in the field. While both types of court decisions can 
be binding, although in the case of the ICJ, no enforcement mechanisms exist to back 
up the court’s decisions (Wolf, 1997). The fact that disputant parties have practically 
no say in the conflict resolution process imposes a serious infringement on 
sovereignty (Wouters et al., 2005). Therefore, states often only go to the ICJ when 
they can accept the ICJ’s decision (Pae, 2006). But also the level of confidentiality 
diminishes considerably when parties are subdued to adjudication (Wouters et al., 
2005). This is the reason why environmental treaties are rarely scrutinised by the 
court of justice or why some treaties only list it as the last possible option, when all 
other means of dispute resolution have failed. The 1978 treaty on the River Gambia is 
one of those, stating that only as a last resort states shall seek assistance of the 
International Court of Justice.  Besides the high sovereignty costs, arbitration and 
adjudication are also regarded as more expensive and time-consuming than other 
methods of conflict resolution (Wouters et al., 2005). Yet, they might be the only 
viable solution when other means fail or when the alternative is a stalemate that will 
result in an unnecessary prolongation of tension. Table 1 presents the differentiation 
of mechanisms.  
 




Sub-Mechanism Nature Third Party 
Consultation Cooperative Absent Negotiation 
Joint Commission of Representatives Cooperative Absent 
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 Unspecified  Cooperative  Absent 
Good Offices Cooperative Passive and 
informal 
Conciliation  Cooperative Passive and 
informal 
Independent Commission Cooperative Passive and 
informal 
Mediation 
Unspecified Cooperative Passive and 
informal 
Not permanent tribunal or board Competitive Active and formal Arbitration 
Permanent arbitration Competitive Active and formal 





4. Dependent Variables 
Our main dependent variables throughout the research are CRM-presence, the type 
of CRM, its order of use, the number of CRM and the place of the CRM in the treaty, 
the conditions under which the CRM is supposed to be put to use, the activation 
procedure and the cost sharing method of the CRM and finally its issue area and 
whether or not the mechanism can be qualified as mature and institutionalised. In case 
the parties agreed to establish a commission, we also look at the voting pattern in 
place.  
 
First we look if the treaty contains a CRM and which type(s) are listed as options to 
the parties. The available mechanisms for conflict resolution as described before in 
section 3 are also presented in table 2 below. When several options are available, the 
treaty sometimes prescribes an order of use of CRM mechanisms. In many cases, 
such as the 1978 treaty on the River Gambia, the treaty between Iraq and Iran of 1976 
and Columbia River Treaty of 1961, the agreement lists an explicit preference for 
negotiation and mediation mechanisms (soft law) and refers only to hard law 
arbitration and adjudication in a second stage. Also the Treaty between Israel and 
Jordan of 1994 lists conciliation and arbitration as options, only when parties 
previously failed to address the dispute through negotiation. When the treaty does not 
command any specific order, parties can choose freely which of the listed CRM to use 
in case of dispute.  
When parties agreed on the establishment of a commission (a joint commission of 
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representatives, in the case of negotiation, or an independent commission, in the case 
of mediation) we expect a variety of voting patterns to be in place, including 
“consensus”, “majority”, “unilaterally (veto)” or “other/issue ignored” when no 
mention of a voting system is made. The Boundary Waters Treaty, for example, states 
that decisions within the commission will be taken by majority.   
 
Other dependent variables refer to the number of CRM per agreement (“low” or 
“high”) and the place of the mechanism in the treaty (“the preamble”, “the treaty 
body”, “the annexes” or “more parts”). Next, we distinguish four main conditions of 
CRM use. Parties can resort to a CRM in case a dispute arises from a  “breach” of the 
agreement or the “interpretation or application” of the treaty terms. In other cases the 
treaty can prescribe CRM only by “periodical review” or whenever a sudden “change 
in physical conditions” should take place. When there is no mention of the conditions 
in which a CRM is supposed to be used, we refer to it as “other” or “unspecified”. For 
example, the Columbia River Treaty leaves this matter unspecified.  
 
A following variable relates to the activation procedure of the CRM, which means 
that parties can either decide “unilaterally”, by “consensus”, through “voting”, or by 
“majority vote” when a CRM will be applied. Eventually the issue can also be 
“ignored” by the treaty. The agreement on cooperation and management of water 
resources in the Danube Basin (1987) stipulates that either one of the contracting 
parties can unilaterally decide to submit an issue to an arbitral tribunal while the 
Boundary Waters Treaty (1909) states can only refer disputes to the International 
Joint Commission by consent of the two parties. We also examine whether the treaty 
specifies the terms of cost sharing. Treaties can apply the “polluter pays principle”, 
prescribe the costs to be “equally divided” or covered by a “third party” or 
beneficiary (“beneficiary pays”). As with other issues, it can also be left “ignored”. 
The treaty between Iran and Iraq of 1975, The Danube Treaty of 1987 as well as the 
1989 treaty between the U.S and Canada on flood control in the Souris River Basin 
line out rules for parties to equally divide the costs that are attached to the use of 
CRM. In these particular cases this concerns the costs of arbitration and the expenses 
of an international joint commission (negotiation).  
 
Another important aspect is the issue area of the CRM and whether the scope of the 
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mechanism has been specified in this sense. This variable controls whether the treaty 
prescribes to which specific water-related issue the CRM is supposed to be applied. 
The TFDD identified 13 issue areas including border issues, economic development, 
fishing, flood control, hydropower, infrastructure/development, irrigation, joint 
management, navigation, technical cooperation, territorial issues, water quality and 
water quantity. Since we only study treaties that consider water as a scarce or 
consumable resource, a quantity to be managed or an ecosystem to be improved/ 
maintained, we exclude fishing and navigation from the categories. Consequently we 
will examine whether the mechanism relates to multiple issues of the treaty or to one 
in specific. Finally, there are two dependent variables that relate to the maturity of a 
CRM and whether or not it is institutionalised. The latter comprises permanent 
commissions (negotiation or mediation) or/and permanent tribunals (arbitration), 
domestic courts and the International Court of Justice (ICJ) (adjudication). Maturity, 
on the other hand, is captured by five of the above-mentioned variables: the condition 
of mechanism use, the activation procedure, the cost sharing method, the issue area, 
and institutionalisation. As mentioned before, we also consider the voting pattern 
when a commission is in place. Depending on whether the specific values of these 
variables are expected to increase or decrease mechanism maturity we codified them 
either “0” or “1”, the latter representing a higher level of maturity. An average of the 
attributed codes finally determines the level of maturity, which ultimately relates to 
whether the CRM can be considered developed. Each treaty in our sample will be 
read, categorised and codified according to the table below. 
 
Table 2. Dependent variables and their values 
Variables Values 
1. CRM Presence  Yes, No 




2b. Order of Use 
 
2c. Voting Pattern 
a) TYPE: Negotiation (consultation, commission of representatives, 
unspecified), Mediation (good offices, conciliation, independent 
commission, unspecified), Arbitration (not permanent, permanent), 
Adjudication (domestic court, ICJ) 
b) ORDER: No (random choice), Yes (1st soft law, 2nd hard law or 
another order) 
 
c) PATTERN: Consensus, Majority, Unilaterally, Other/issue ignored 
3. Number of CRM 
 
No CRM: {0} 
Lower number of CRM: {1, 2}  
Higher number of CRM: {< 3}  
4.  Place of the CRM in the treaty Preamble, Treaty body, Annex 
5.  Condition of use Breach, Interpretation/application, Periodical review, Change in physical 
conditions, Failure of a previous mechanism, Issue ignored 
6. Activation  Unilaterally, Majority, Consensus, Issue ignored 
7. Cost-Sharing method of the CRM Polluter pays, Equally divided, Third party, Beneficiary pays, Issue ignored 
7. Issue Area of the CRM Single issue, Multiple issues 
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8. Institutionalisation Institutionalised (Joint commission of representatives, Independent 
commission, permanent arbitration, domestic court, ICJ),  
Not Institutionalised (consultation, unspecified form of negotiation, good 
offices, unspecified form of mediation, no permanent arbitration) 
9. Maturity Averaged value of:  
a) Condition of use: issue ignored (0), other categories:  (1) 
b) Activation procedure: unilaterally, issue ignored (0), other categories (1) 
c) Cost sharing: issue ignored (0), other categories (1) 
d) Issue area: single issue (0), multiple issues (1) 
e) Institutionalisation: not institutionalised (0), institutionalised (1) 
! {a+b+c+d+e} / 5 = value between 0-1 with: Immature CRM: 0.00-0.49 
and 
Mature CRM: 0.50-1.00 
 
5. What affects the choice of CRM: a transaction cost approach 
In this section we review the expected costs of CRM and hypothesise how this 
potentially determines the adoption of conflict resolution.  
The origins and application of the transaction cost (also TC) theorem are based 
mainly on the findings of Ronald Coase, a British economist who stated that:  
 “In order to carry out a transaction it is necessary to know what we are dealing 
with and on what terms, to conduct negotiations leading up to a bargain, to draw 
up a contract, to undertake the inspection needed to make sure the terms of the 
contract are being observed and so on” (Coase, 1988).  
 
Hence, this presupposes the need for parties to gather information relevant to the 
transaction, to bargain extensively over the terms of exchange while trying to 
establish the necessary institutional instruments for effective monitoring and/or 
enforcement. These actions, however, are potentially very costly and often 
sufficiently costly as to prevent a transaction of taking place (Coase, 1970; Kesting, 
2007). While the nature of international river basins and the growing 
interdependencies between riparians, give states a clear incentive for establishing 
shared agreements, states are also “rational egoists” and will only adhere agreements 
of which the terms offer mutual interests and a stand to gain from (Keohane, 
1989:18). As with every transaction, the expected benefits of the treaty should 
outweigh the costs. If transaction costs are too high, parties will not even bother to 
negotiate an agreement or to use it effectively (Gilligan, 2003). Low costs on the 
other hand are believed to stimulate the adoption of CRM (Libecap, 1995; Streit, 
1998; Bernauer, 2002; Rao, 2003). Hence, while the existence of transaction costs 
constrains the choices for solving real-world problems, an understanding of the role of 
TC allows us to evaluate pragmatic alternatives and chose the most efficient one 
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(Rao, 2001:67). As such, the transaction cost paradigm provides a framework for 
analysing the choice of governance mechanism used by contracting parties to govern 
their interaction (Boadu, 1998). When it comes to dispute resolution, the main 
question remains therefore how the TC affects the choice of CRM. 
 
Along the line of general distinctions made in transaction cost (TC) literature, we 
distinguish between two types of costs: political costs (ex ante), attached to the 
establishment of a mechanism on one hand, and monitoring and enforcement costs 
(ex post), brought about by the operation of a mechanism on the other (Coase, 1970; 
Williamson, 1985). Since ex-post costs usually occur together15, we will further 
discuss them as such. Yet, it is important to note that the two sets of cost elements (ex 
ante and ex post) are usually interdependent, hence an attempt to minimise one set of 
TC might affect the entire cost frame (Rao, 2003:8). In his study of the international 
water transfer treaty between Lesotho and the Republic of South Africa, Boadu 
(1998) illustrates this interdependency when pointing to the fact that parties 
deliberately incur ex ante costs of contracting and negotiation in order to reduce the 
risk of increased ex post costs. For example, it might be possible to lower monitoring 
costs in time by addressing problems of uncertainty beforehand and including as 
much future contingencies as possible
16
. Yet, negotiating each one of these 
contingencies will be a timely and costly activity, eventually implying a sharp 
increase of the bargaining expense (Boadu, 1998). This highlights the importance of 
TC at different stages (Rao, 2003:168). In what follows below we examine each of 
the different cost elements and we select a number of proxies to assess them. A table 
at the end of this chapter summarises the entire theoretical framework, while the 
codebook in annex provides more details on the proxies and databases used for our 
research. 
 
5.1 Political Costs 
In this section we examine the main elements of the political cost, or the costs 
attached to the establishment of a rule, arrangement or an institutional mechanism. It 
is the part of the TC parties encounter when trying to internalise and lower the cost of 
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 Appropriate enforcement, for example, also requires monitoring activities, which will at its turn 
induce a cost (Furubotn and Richter, 2000). 
16
 In summary, trying to lower ex post TC might come at the expense of ex ante TC, or vice versa.  
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future externalities and optimise the benefits expected from the agreement between 
them. Hence, in our study these costs relate to the process of negotiating and 
eventually adopting a CRM. In this section we will identify the different elements of 
political costs and monitoring and enforcement costs, while examining the factors that 
affect them in real life. Hereby we follow a distinction based upon earlier work of 
Coase (1937), Williamson (1985), Hodgson (1988), Levi (1988), Ostrom (et al.1993), 
Furubotn and Richter (2000) and Rao (2003) which lists uncertainty costs and 
bargaining costs as part of the political transaction cost (ex ante) and monitoring and 





5.1.1 Uncertainty costs 
The problem of uncertainty is an essential obstacle that needs to be dealt with when 
negotiating solutions to a variety of environmental problems (Faber et al, 1992; Pahl-
Wostl, 2002, 2007; Sigel et al, 2007). Negotiations usually take place under 
conditions of considerable complexity and uncertainty, and often it is not economical 
for the parties to specify in advance how they ought to behave under every 
conceivable contingency (Schwartz and Sykes, 2002).  
This is particularly the case for water (UNEP, 2006) because a continuous lack of 
knowledge about the future physical conditions of the world’s water resources poses 
unique challenges to global water management (Pahl-Wostl and Jeffrey, 2007; 
Drieschova at al., 2010). For example, uncertainty about groundwater flow combined 
with intensified dependency on this resource will likely shape states incentives to 
reach an agreement (Bhaduri, 2006) and might even spark conflicts over water 
quantity and quality (Jarvis et al., 2005). In other words, there is increased uncertainty 
about how to manage water resources due to legitimate concerns about scientific 
knowledge (Ostrom et all. 1993; Sigel et al., 2007), about how this knowledge will 
affect parties’ preferences, now and in the future (Hipel et al., 2004), about insecure 
economic costs (Koppel, 2009), about changes in water use (Drieschova et al., 2010) 
and about the changing context of the resource (Ostrom et al., 1993; IPPC, 2007). But 
While the establishment of an agreement between riparians might be a response to 
such uncertainties (Yoffe et al., 2003) and a primary component in states ability to 
                                                
17
 From here on we will refer mainly to political costs on one side and monitoring and enforcement 
costs on the other. 
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prevent and resolve water-related disputes (Wolf, 1998), the agreement itself might 
leave space for further, endogenous uncertainties
18
 concerning treaty implementation 
and treaty finance (Drieschova et al., 2010). As discussed below, unaddressed 
uncertainty of any kind is likely to create space for dysfunctional decision-making or 
controversy.  
 
As such, environmental uncertainty can give lead to high environmental costs. In his 
contribution to “The Drama of the Commons” Wilson discovers for example that 
scientific uncertainty induces conservation problems because of the fact that we build 
our governing institutions on an inappropriate scientific conception while the 
individual incentives that result from this fiction are mostly not aligned with goals of 
sustainability (NRC, 2002:327). In this case, the cost of scientific uncertainty results 
in the creation of dysfunctional governance structures, which in their turn obstruct 
conservation of a scarce resource. This and other costs related to uncertainty can 
effectively block adaptive attempts to changing environmental conditions (Hamlet, 
2010)
19
. Also Challen’s study of the Murray-Darling Basin offers an illustration of 
Hardin’s thesis that environmental uncertainty can lead to over-harvesting and even 
resource depletion (Hardin, 1982). Lack of knowledge on the hydrological dynamics 
of this river system made it impossible for riparians to set a limit to water 
withdrawals, which in time could induce environmental costs for all riparians in the 
basin (Challen, 2000:151). Hence it is obvious that uncertainty about the current 
availability of the resource, as well as about the rate at which it replenishes itself, can 
considerably affect individual harvesting behaviour, cause over-consumption of the 
resource while eventually giving lead to ineffective and unsustainable resource 
management (Hine and Gifford, 1996)
20
.  
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 Broadly speaking: endogenous uncertainty relates to uncertainties inside the treaty, while exogenous 
uncertainty relates to contextual uncertainties. The later-mentioned number of signatories is a source of 
endogenous uncertainty, while hydrological variability is an exogenous uncertainty.  
19
 In his case study of the Pacific Northwest Region of North America, Hamlet (2010) describes the 
primary obstacles to adaptive response in the domain of water policy to be assumptions of stationarity 
as the fundamental basis of water resources system design, entrenched use of historic records as the 
sole basis for planning, short time planning, lack of familiarity with climate science and models, and 
downscaling procedures. All of which can be considered costs caused by scientific uncertainty and lack 
of knowledge.   
20
 It is generally expected (and verified again by a study of Hine and Gifford) that under conditions of 
uncertainty, harvesters develop overly optimistic estimates of upcoming regeneration rates and thus to 
increase their harvests in comparison to harvesters that have more precise information about 
regeneration rates (Budescu, et al., 1990; Rapoport et al., 1992; Hine and Gifford, 1996). 
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Yet besides irrationally high environmental costs, uncertainty, if left unaddressed, can 
also give lead to elevated political or monetary costs. Differing interpretations of the 
evolving environmental circumstances, for example, are likely to stir discussions 
about the management of a shared system (John and Weitz, 1988) and spark conflict 
between resource users at a local, regional or even at state level. Eventually, such 
controversies might run the risk of turning a water matter into a broader political 
conflict (Fischhendler, 2008)
21
.  In general, international conflict will and has already 
hindered the adoption of potential solutions to resource management problems (Just et 
al., 1994). 
 
Yet, to reduce these complexities, to facilitate better resource management and to 
avoid conflict, cooperation across boundaries is needed. The higher the level of 
uncertainty, the more institutions need to permit adaptive decision-making because 
renegotiation is difficult in changed circumstances (John and Weitz, 1988). But when 
conditions of environmental uncertainty create a need for regulations and mechanisms 
able to address ambiguity, the same conditions might cause a rise of the political costs 
and make states cautious for engaging in comprehensive agreements (Just et al., 
1994
22
). For example, while uncertainty over information and knowledge was a factor 
for the U.S to pull out of Kyoto, it provided the E.U with an incentive to “act before it 
is too late”
23
, fearing an otherwise uncontrollable acceleration of climate change 
related costs (Kolstad, 2004). For this reason there is controversy in the literature 
about how uncertainty affects state behaviour in the establishment of environmental 
agreements
24
 (Kolstad, 2004). In an attempt to avoid the elevated costs attached to it, 
we hypothesis that the higher the uncertainty, the more states will be stimulated to 
adopt CRM. More in particular, few studies focus on the benefits of soft-law 
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 In the case of the Israeli-Jordanian treaty continuous drought and deteriorating political relations 
allowed for the ambiguity in their shared water agreement to turn into a destructive factor for the peace 
relations between the two countries (Fischhendler, 2008). 
22
 Just, Horowitz and Netanyahu (1994) discuss this mainly from a water perspective stating that 
countries will be more reluctant to give up their entire claim to a constraining resource when 
uncertainty over future contingencies and demand growth is high.  
23
 For example: “There is also agreement that the scientific evidence is solid enough to warrant 
concrete and urgent action. Delaying action could increase both the rate and the eventual magnitude of 
climate change and hence adaptation and damage costs.” (Delegation of the European Commission to 
the US, 9/2001: http://www.eurunion.org/legislat/climatechange.htm) 
24
 Some scholars point to the fact that uncertainty over the distribution of costs and benefits facilitates 
agreement (Brennan and Buchanan, 1985:30) while others find that it retards agreement (Fernandez 
and Rodrik, 1991) 
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mechanisms when negotiating agreements under uncertainty, pointing to the fact that 
they still allow parties to formulate specific terms and requirements, without binding 
them legally to its terms in the future (Abbot and Snidal, 2000; Koppel, 2009). For 
this reason we expect states to prefer soft-law mechanisms such as negotiation and 
mediation when uncertainty is high. In what follows we will discuss the two 
indicators of which we expect an influence on this matter of uncertainty. These 
include the number of signatories and the variability of the hydrological system. 
 
Hypothesis A: “The higher the uncertainty costs, the lower the political cost, hence 
the more we expect the adoption of CRM to be stimulated”.  
 
 
Hypothesis A.1: “The higher the uncertainty costs, the lower the political cost, hence 
the more we expect parties to a negotiated agreement to adopt soft law CRM such as 
negotiation and mediation”  
 
a) Number of Signatories 
Accordingly, the number of signatories has been acknowledged as an important cause 
of complexity
25
 and treaty-related uncertainty. A shift from bilateral to multilateral 
treaties will most likely entail a rise of the uncertainty costs (Gilligan, 2003), as an 
increased number of parties implies difficulties of processing information necessary 
to find a zone of possible agreement, and of successfully negotiating an outcome 
within this zone (Koremenos, 2005; Downie, 2008). Barrett (2003) went a step further 
stating that a high number of players not only increases complexity but also signifies 
an enhanced risk of dispute. Especially when multiple parties of diverse backgrounds 
are involved, a spectrum of opinions, expectations and values must be accommodated 
and even the framing of the problem alone may result in ambiguities and conflicting 
opinions (Brugnach et al., 2008). In the case of most transboundary rivers, the number 
of riparian countries per basin is usually quite small. Yet, there are important 
exceptions such as the Danube (12), Niger (10), Nile (10), Zambezi (8) or the Mekong 
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 An increase in the number of signatories generally refers to an increase in “horizontal” complexity, 




. In virtually all of these cases heterogeneous preferences have resulted in 
protracted conflict among riparians (Bernauer in Young, 1997:172). Although the 
literature on multilateral negotiations is limited, one of the main focuses of 
negotiation scholars has been on how parties to such negotiations manage complexity 
(Crump and Zartman, 2003). It has been found that under conditions of high 
uncertainty, parties expect more benefits from entering an agreement (and to 
cooperate in general) (Young, 1994). When the number of parties is high, or when the 
environmental problem an agreement intends to address
27
, regards many countries 
instead of only a few, this incentive appears to grow.  
One way to address this kind of uncertainty is the establishment of an institutional 
umbrella. Kasper and Streit (1998) argue that costs induced by uncertainty can be 
kept relatively low if there is a possibility to extrapolate from past experiences or 
analogue cases, consequently avoiding innovation (Hodgson, 1988). Therefore it is 
useful to organise parties in a permanent way as to accumulate information and to 
prevent the costs of creating new rules (Axelrod, 1984; Keohane, 1984; Young, 1989; 
Keohane and Ostrom, 1995; Gilligan, 2003; Conca, 2006). A rise in uncertainty costs, 
inherent to multilateral treaties and caused by increased complexity, may provide 
decision-makers with an argument to adopt more institutionalised procedures and 
mature forms of CRM. 
 
b) Hydrological Variability 
While riparians set up rules and structures to govern their shared water resources, they 
must also consider uncertainties relating to the nature of the resource, such as 
hydrological variability. In a case study of the Murray-Darling Basin Ray, Challen 
finds that most of the uncertainty that relates to the environmental and ecological 
consequences of current levels and patterns of water use arises from the variability of 
the river system (Challen, 2000:151). This variability is so high little or no statistical 
generalisations can be made. But hydrological variability means also an enhanced risk 
of conflict. Among the most difficult situations to deal with is the upstream-
downstream problem (Bernauer in Young, 1997:171) where a gradual change in 
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 Others include the Zaire (9), Amazon (7), Volta (6), Ganges-Brahmaputra (5) and LaPlata (5) river 
basins (United Nations, 1978). 
27
 This means that the externalities attached to the environmental problem should at least be reciprocal 
and not unidirectional (Barret, 1990).  
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precipitation patterns and abrupt shifts in water variability might cause the inability of 
states to meet their mutual obligations regarding the allocation of their shared 
resources. While riparians may be inevitably driven to treaty violation, an incentive 
for international dispute is created. In her study on transboundary river floods Bakker 
(2006) finds that an increase in transboundary floods may contribute to conflict, 
especially if there are no mechanisms in place to absorb (sudden) change. An increase 
of the institutional capacity and flexibility of transboundary agreements will therefore 
reduce the likelihood of future flood-related conflicts (Bakker, 2006). Obviously, the 
same accounts for drought-related alterations, where states may opt to include specific 
conflict resolution procedures that allow them to change existing water allocations 
(Feitelson and Haddad, 1999). If the treaty does not foresee in such flexibility 
procedures, expensive and often-repetitive operational measures might have to be 
required to answer sudden changes in variability. As such, it is clear that parties 
benefit from adopting CRM under circumstances of high variability. At the same time 
well-defined arrangements reduce transaction costs of negotiated decisions, for 
example, by reducing the amount of information that must be collected (Challen, 
2000:29). In other words, policymakers can limit further uncertainties about CRM 
implementation by adopting more mature mechanisms.  
 
Hypothesis 1: “The higher the number of parties to a negotiated agreement and the 
higher the hydrological variability, the higher the uncertainty costs and the political 
costs, hence we expect parties to adopt a high number of CRM's, and more mature 
and institutionalised forms of CRM” 
 
5.1.2 Bargaining costs 
Although negotiation among countries is unavoidable, political barriers can 
complicate the process substantially (Le Marquand, 1977). The costs of bargaining 
relate to the outlays that must be made when parties decide upon an institutional 
arrangement. Therefore one should expect international institutions to appear 
whenever the transaction costs are relatively low compared to the benefits to be 
derived from the exchange (Keohane, 1989:166-67). Negotiating a treaty is costly 
(Garriga, 2009) and every mechanism or arrangement incorporated in it requires 
further effort (Miles and Posner, 2008) and will bring about an additional bargaining 
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cost. Hence, despite the need to adopt conflict resolution mechanisms as to increase a 
treaty’s flexibility to cope with growing rates of change, variability and uncertainty, 
states find it difficult to do so and as a result many treaties still lack such language 
(Goldeman, 1988; Hamner and Wolf, 1998; Fischhendler, 2004). This is primarily 
due to the fact that the unifying principles of integrated watershed management clash 
with the forces of state sovereignty and the principle of self-government (Wouters et 
al., 2005; De Stefano et al., 2010). For example, in a case study of the transboundary 
basins between the US and Canada and Israel and Jordan, Fischhendler (2004) found 
that crisis-mitigating mechanisms were excluded from treaties because they were seen 
as posing a threat to national sovereignty, which boosted the political cost of their 
inclusion. The same occurred in the lower Rio Grande basin, where the US was 
cautious to establish a comprehensive treaty in scale and scope, because it feared the 
International Boundary and Water Commission to become a supranational 
organisation that could have basin-wide authority (Fischhendler, 2004). As a 
consequence the water commission was delegated only limited power, eventually 
causing its inability to meet the challenge of climate uncertainty.  
 
In conjecture, it has been found that non-binding rules and soft law mechanisms 
constitute a less significant infringement of state sovereignty (Abbot and Snidal, 
2000; Fischhendler, 2004), hence impose lower bargaining costs upon the parties. For 
this reason states generally prefer to adopt mechanisms such as negotiation and 
mediation - or in the case of the Boundary Waters Treaty (1909) more support for 
non-binding arbitration from the part of the U.S. (Fischhendler, 2004). Yet, it should 
be noted that regardless whether the CRM is soft or hard law, if bargaining costs are 
high, negotiating the inclusion of a CRM might impose an extra cost upon the 
process, which parties will be eager to avoid. That is, if these costs are perceived to 
outweigh the benefits. This follows the logic that countries that wish to adhere an 
agreement, will have to abate more than countries that do not wish to adhere an 
agreement, hence they will also incur higher costs. Hence, every clause and every 
mechanism will therefore induce an extra cost. This leads us to the basic hypothesis 
concerning the bargaining cost and the adoption of CRM: 
Hypothesis B: “The higher the bargaining costs, the higher is the political costs 
hence the more we expect the adoption of CRM to be hindered” 
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In our study we expect the bargaining costs to be affected mainly by the level of trust 
among parties, the political compatibility of regimes, the degree of water poverty, the 
adaptive capacity of the signatories and the degree in which they are dependent upon 
external resources for their water supply. Below follows a description of each of these 
indicators, with specific hypothesis, which illustrate the influence we expect from 
each one of them on the bargaining cost, hence the adoption of conflict resolution. 
 
a) Level of Trust  
Lack of trust between political entities can obstruct cooperation and its consequential 
benefits and can induce often-unnecessary outlays. Fragile diplomatic relations, for 
example, may increase the political desire for agricultural self-sufficiency, leading to 
subsidisation of water to agriculture hence to irrational water use, inefficiency of 
water pricing and disputes over allocation issues (Just et al., 1994). This is a clear 
standard bargaining consideration that induces a raise of the political costs and, 
consequently, hinders cooperation in spite of large potential gains. Yet, when mutual 
trust is lacking, soft law mechanisms may allow states to tackle a problem collectively 
at a time they otherwise might not have approached (Koppel, 2009). In other words, 
when the cost of bargaining is high because of distrustful relations between states, 
soft law mechanisms and nonbinding arrangements may offer an alternative to 
binding resolutions as they will enable governments to formulate their commitments 
more precisely and ambitiously than would be the case when the mechanisms are 
binding (Koppel, 2009)
28
. Also, Fischhendler (2004) found that the cost of some 
climate-uncertainty mechanisms could be decreased if their adoption or activation is 
conditional on a unanimous decision-making process. This is especially the case for 
states that share ambiguous relations, because they are more likely to introduce a 
requirement of consensus in order to activate any rule or procedure, including conflict 
resolution (Benvenisti, 1996). Consequently, the above leads us to the following 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2a:“The lower the level of trust among parties to a negotiated agreement, 
the higher the bargaining and political costs, hence the more we expect parties to 
adopt soft law CRM’s such as negotiation and mediation”  
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 Conversely, it has been found that states with strained relations are less likely to incorporate binding 
mechanisms into agreements (Wouters et al., 2005). 
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Hypothesis 2.b: “The lower the level of trust among the parties, the higher the 
bargaining and political costs, hence the more we expect the parties to adopt a 
consensus-rule for CRM-activation” 
 
b) Political Compatibility 
Second, we expect the political make-up of the respective state regimes to influence 
the bargaining costs. When states differ substantially with regards to their political 
systems, preferences, resources and information, more time and effort will be required 
to bargain an agreement (Ostrom et al., 1993:check page), a cost-provoking effect that 
becomes stronger when the number of parties involved is high (Lindemann, 2005). 
Conversely, parties with the same expectations and preferences face lower bargaining 
costs (Shirley, 2003). The literature on international conflict and cooperation presents 
democratic systems as more peaceful to one another as opposed to autocratic or 
politically asymmetric
29
 dyads (Rummel, 1993). One reason for the relative harmony 
among democracies relates to their domestic political culture, which is characterised 
by regulated political competition, conflict resolution and compromise (De Stefano et 
al., 2010). Consequently, when democratic regimes interact with each other, these 
domestic characteristics are extrapolated to the international arena (Russet, 1993)
30
. 
This claim has been examined in the environmental politics literature (Neumayer, 
2002b, Bernauer et al., 2010) and the hydro-politics literature (Espey and Towfique, 
2004; De Stefano et al., 2010). As a related conjecture, it is believed that democracies 
are more committed to resolve transboundary problems
31
 (Kalbhenn, 2007) and more 
able to handle the ever increasing environmental challenges in a non-violent manner 
(Auvinen, 1997; Gurr, 2000). In addition, democratic regimes tend to interact more 
than autocratic ones (Milner, 1997) while also having more alternative forms of 
conflict resolution available
32
(De Stefano et al., 2010). For this reason we expect 
them to engage more in cooperative processes of conflict resolution such as interstate 
negotiation and mediation (Carroll, 1988; Keohane et al., 2000).  
From the above follows the first premises that democratic dyads do not necessarily 
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 Politically asymmetric dyads are made up of one democratic and one autocratic country. 
30
 This means that the domestic political practices of democracies, which are characterised by an 
enhanced openness of the political system, are translated in the international arena when democratic 
systems interact wit each other. 
31
 Specifically in the form of treaty signature and formalised cooperation (De Stefano et al., 2010) 
32
 As opposed to non-democracies 
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face lower bargaining costs, as their domestic political procedures may cause 
negotiations to be lengthy and burdensome, but rather that their common notion of 
consensus politics implies a mutual preference for the adoption of soft-law regulation.  
Second, mixed dyads are expected to face higher bargaining costs, because of their 
heterogeneous preferences and approaches to problem solving (see above). 
Eventually, this might hinder the adoption of institutional mechanisms such as CRM. 
Third, as mentioned before the costs of negotiating an agreement with or between 
democracies might well be high. Democracies face a series of political constraints 
mainly at the domestic level. At the level of public opinion, for example, democratic 
institutions create audience costs
33
 (Fearon, 1994) and democratic leaders need 
majoritarian consensus to govern (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003). Within autocratic 
regimes, these costs are either lower or absent. Therefore, we build upon Garrida’s 
study on the formalisation of bilateral treaties when stipulating that autocratic dyads 
face lower bargaining costs than mixed dyads (one democracy and one autocracy) and 
pairs of democracies (Garrida, 2009). Since the political price of bargaining 
international institutional arrangements is lower for autocratic regimes, we expect 
them to adopt a higher number of CRM, less mature forms of CRM and more hard-
law mechanisms. 
The hypothesis here is therefore threefold: 
Hypothesis 3a: “The more the parties to a negotiated agreement are democratic, the 
higher the bargaining costs, the more we expect them to adopt soft-law mechanisms 
such as negotiation and mediation” 
Hypothesis 3b:  “The more the parties to a negotiated agreement are politically 
incompatible (mixed), the higher the bargaining and political costs, hence the more 
we expect them to adopt a low number of CRM” 
Hypothesis 3c: “The more the parties to a negotiated agreement are autocratic, the 
lower the political and the bargaining costs, hence the more we expect them to adopt 
a high number of CRM, more immature forms of CRM and more hard-law CRM such 
as arbitration and adjudication” 
 
c) Water Scarcity  
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 In the sense that they need to defend their policy to their citizens and the requirement of 
transparency of the decision making process also entails a price.  
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Many authors already focussed on the link between resource scarcity and (violent) 
conflict. Homer-Dixon (1991) is undoubtedly one of the main scholars focussing on 
this nexus in the environmental field, complemented by many other environmental 
and hydro-political scholars (Wolf, 1997; Elhance, 1999; Ohlsson, 2000; Bernauer, 
2010). In all of these studies water scarcity is in some way believed to induce conflict 
or at least to create a risk thereto
34
. Ohlsson (2000) finds that it might not necessarily 
be the lack of water inducing interstate conflict, yet more the lack of institutions to 
adapt it. On the other hand, Lynne et al. (1990) point out that water poverty can lead 
to disputes, but that this risk increases considerably when parties also differ in values, 
beliefs and hence behaviour over water issues. Conversely, if we consider Dinar’s 
idea of an U-shaped relation, scarcity may induce cooperation instead, at least when it 
does not exceed a certain level (Dinar, 2006). Hence scarcity might be a necessary 
condition for cooperation to take place, but not a sufficient one.  
Be it that the lack of scientific evidence does not allow us to hypothesise a direct link 
between scarcity and conflict (Buhaug et al., 2008; Bernauer, 2010) we can fairly 
argue that it gives states an incentive to bargain institutional mechanisms able to 
address conflict. Yet, our hypotheses is that while dyads characterised by high water 
scarcity and a higher risk of conflict would benefit more from adopting a higher 
number of CRM, the political costs attached to bargaining such a mechanism under 
conditions of high scarcity might rise considerably, eventually blocking the adoption 
of such mechanisms. The reasoning is that states in a water scarce position will be 
even more cautious to preserve and safeguard their already limited resources. The 
general mistrust among water scarce riparians will be high (Dinar et al., 2007:130), 
which will cause a rise of the bargaining costs and dampen countries’ aspiration to 
adopt CRM, especially mature forms that need even more intensive bargaining. 
Consequently, we believe that highly water scarce dyads will adopt less CRM than 
mixed dyads (a combination of high and low scarcity). However, the way in which 
the quantity of water present in a nation influences the arrangements, also holds stand 
in the opposite direction. If water is abundant, there is no need for tight arrangements 
among users and conflicts and environmental concerns will be minimal (Bakker, 
2006).  
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 P.e: Homer-Dixon notes that conflicts over water are likely to occur, but only under specific 
conditions such as a history of antagonism between two countries (Homer-Dixon, 1999:179). 
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Hypothesis 4:“ The more the parties to a negotiated agreement are water scarce, the 
higher the bargaining and political costs, hence the more we expect parties to adopt a 
low number of CRM and immature forms of CRM” 
 
d) Adaptive Capacity  
The adaptive capacity of states to respond to hazards caused by variability and 
resource scarcity is a third factor of which we expect an influence on the bargaining 
cost, hence the political cost. Adaptive capacity concerns the degree to which 
adjustments in practices, processes, or structures can moderate or offset the potential 
for damage or take advantage of opportunities created by a given change in climate 
(IPCC, 2001:89). As we already mentioned resource variability threatens stability in 
two ways; on one hand there is the gradual reduction of water availability (for 
example through the rise of sea-level or desertification) while on the other hand 
stability will be put to a test through sudden or unexpected climate-induced events 
such as flash floods and droughts (Buhaug et al., 2008). Both aspects are responsible 
for high uncertainty costs that require the development of adaptive institutions and 
innovation (Homer Dixon, 1999). Yet, the level to which states are able to respond to 
future challenges also greatly influences their position in the negotiation process.  
The available literature identifies economic wealth, technology, information and 
skills, infrastructure, institutions and equity as the main determinants which make 
regions, countries or communities able to adapt to change (IPCC, 2001:895), hence as 
the main drivers of the bargaining costs (Homer Dixon, 1999; Yohe, 2001).  
 
Generally it is assumed that countries with high adaptive capacity are more resilient
35
 
to changes while also being able to make more concessions than vulnerable states 
when bargaining. For example, countries that dispose over strong economic assets and 
capital resources are assumed to be better prepared to bear the costs of adaptation 
(Burton, 1996:55-67). It can enable them to find substitutes and alternative sources 
for water and may allow better adaptation to climate change through technological 
and other means (De Stefano et al., 2010). India’s wealth, for example, illustrates how 
a high GDP can influence bargaining over shared resources. In this case it obviously 
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 More resilient means less sensitive and more able to adapt to variability and change (IPCC, 
2001:89). 
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enables a state to act unilaterally in the development of a shared resource while 
imposing the Mega River Linking Project, a plan to link dozens of rivers and divert 
water from the Ganges River to parts of the country that are prone to water scarcity 
(De Stefano et al., 2010)
36
. However, there is great uncertainty about the way the 
main determinants of adaptive capacity are expected to develop in the future. 
Concerns about population growth or economic wealth, for example, can cause states 
to be very cautious when it comes to matters of water allocation, eventually 
obstructing the adoption of rational and adaptive water policies. Hamlet (2010) finds 
that while some future projections about these determinants are commonly 
incorporated in planning studies, they are not typically considered in planning. This 
implies they may be left unaddressed and can distort policy decisions related to water 
infrastructure or allocation, which are generally very difficult, if not impossible to 
reverse (Hamlet, 2010).  
 
 
The following hypothesis is two-fold: 
Hypothesis 5a:“The higher the adaptive capacity (symmetric) of the parties to a 
negotiated agreement, the lower the bargaining and political costs, hence the more 
we expect parties to adopt a high number of CRM” 
Hypothesis 5b:“The more the parties to a negotiated agreement are asymmetric in 
their capacity to adapt, the higher the bargaining costs and the political costs, hence 
the more we expect unilateralism in the voting pattern of a commission and as an 
activation procedure of the CRM” 
 
e) External Resource Dependency 
By way of conjecture with the former hypotheses on water poverty and adaptive 
capacity, we also consider external resource dependency as an indicator to assess the 
bargaining costs. Homer-Dixon (1999:179) believes that among all renewable 
resources, water might be the most likely candidate for stimulating international 
conflict, yet he adds that such disputes are likely to occur only under special 
conditions such as high dependency on extra-territorial water resources. Hence, when 
states depend largely on external resources for their national supply, they have a clear 
                                                
36
 Naturally, this will affect the intake of water for Bangladesh, as a downstream riparian. 
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incentive to negotiate (Just et al., 1994), in particularly regarding arrangements of 
conflict resolution. Yet, at the same time their dependency induces political costs that 
may obstruct such outcomes.  For example, Syria’s dependency on Jordanian water 
for agriculture in the south is likely to drive up the bargaining costs when negotiating 
the allocation of shared waters, because Syrian negotiators will be reluctant to give up 
any rights to the resources. On the other hand, Lebanon’s economy does not depend 
on external water resources, in this case the Jordan, which leaves the country more 
space and flexibility in negotiations (Just et al., 1994). As such we expect great 
dependency on external water resources to drive up the bargaining costs, eventually 
obstructing the negotiation and incorporation of conflict resolution mechanisms. 
Hypothesis 6: “The more the parties to a negotiated agreement are dependent upon 
external resources, the higher the bargaining and political costs, hence the more we 
expect them to adopt a low number of CRM” 
 
In summary, we assume that states take up bargaining costs in order to reduce the 
costs of future transactions within the same international framework (Moravcsik, 
1999). Yet, if bargaining such new institutions and arrangements is too costly, states 
will not bother to negotiate (Gilligan, 2003).  
 
 5.2. Monitoring and Enforcement Costs 
Treaties are not only costly to negotiate but also to enforce (Miles and Posner, 2008). 
If it were possible for parties to envision all future contingencies, reach prior 
agreement about how they should be handled and develop enforceable mechanisms, 
all transaction costs involved would be expended prior to the agreement (Ostrom et 
al., 1993). But because of the need to monitor the agreed upon mechanisms (Furubotn 
and Richter, 2000) and to ensure the parties fulfil their exchange obligations 
(Maitland et al., 2009) ex-post transaction costs or continuing costs nearly always 
occur (Furubotn and Richter, 2000). Each party must monitor the other in order to 
guard against treaty violations and even after the violation is detected, the cost of 
enforcement still lingers (Miles and Posner, 2008). A breach of the treaty terms is 
often the result of ambiguity or state incapacity to comply with the treaty (Downs, 
1998) and enforcement costs may in such case appear as the temporary suspension of 
the provisions agreed upon in the treaty. If, for example, such provision includes the 
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production of a public good, enforcement procedures might obstruct its supply. 
 
It is generally assumed that while states could achieve deeper cooperation with higher 
levels of enforcement, states often do not want more enforcement (Downs, 1998). 
Avoidance of the costs attached to could be a very plausible reason for this. Yet, when 
treaties leave space for ambiguity, states might have different opinions about when a 
treaty violation has taken place and about what form of punishment or enforcement 
they see necessary as a response. On the contrary, when a formal dispute resolution 
procedure is in place, accuracy of the violation assessment and the appropriate 
response will be improved. Since hard law is more precise, the cost of interpretation 
and delegation, which specifies procedures for conflict resolution, will decrease 
(Abott and Snidal, 2000). Hence, we assume that states that wish to avoid high 
enforcement costs would in fact benefit more from adopting sophisticated 
mechanisms, including hard law CRM. Yet, negotiating such a mechanism would 
clearly induce a higher political cost, especially in terms of bargaining. Also 
institutionalisation is believed to lower the enforcement costs
37
 (since a framework for 
enforcement is already available), yet it may increase the monitoring costs (a 
permanent commission equals permanent monitoring and permanent expenses) and 
the political costs of negotiating and establishing the institute.  
 
Unrelated to the type or institutionalised character of the mechanism, it is understood 
that parties that univocally agree upon a mechanism (consensus), will more carry and 
support the adopted mechanism and the costs of its monitoring and enforcement will 
be lower than in other cases (Ostrom, 1990:204). For this reason we may expect states 
to adopt CRM upon consensus, even if it comes at a higher political cost (in terms of 
negotiating and finding a space of general agreement). Finally, also the context of the 
resource will affect the monitoring costs, as it is more difficult and costly to monitor 
large resources (Ostrom, 1990:204) (not sure if I need this). To assess monitoring and 
enforcement costs we consider two variables; the level of trust among parties and the 
state history in relation to colonisation. 
 
Hypothesis C.1: “The lower the enforcement costs, the more parties to a negotiated 
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 Ostrom, 1990:204; Pae, 2006. 
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agreement will adopt mature and institutionalised forms of CRM, including hard 
law mechanisms, hence the higher the political costs” 
Hypothesis C.2: “The lower the monitoring and enforcement costs, the more parties 
to a negotiated agreement will adopt CRM upon consensus, hence the higher the 











a) Level of Trust 
First, we assume that trustful relations will bring about lower monitoring and 
enforcement costs over time, as uniform ideas exist about implementation procedures 
and the nature of fair solutions to disputes (Furubotn and Richter, 2000; Ostrom, 
2005). States that mistrust each other, however, will fear more cheating and breaching 
of the treaty terms over time (Dinar et al., 2007:150). For that reason we would expect 
them to address such risks by incorporating a higher number of CRM. 
 
Hypothesis 7: “The lower the level of trust among the parties to a negotiated 
agreement, the higher the monitoring and enforcement costs, hence the more we 
expect them to adopt a high number of CRM” 
 
b) State History (Colonisation) 
Building on the assumptions of Miles and Posner (2008) we assume the history of the 
country to play a role in the determination of ex post costs. Their study states that 
older countries face lower transaction costs than newer countries do, mainly because 
older countries have more established customs, norms and political institutions, which 
allow for smoother operation of the government and hence cheaper monitoring and 
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enforcement of treaties. However, in conjecture it could be argued that older countries 
have more and more sophisticated means available for monitoring and enforcement, 
and many of them can be very costly. Therefore we prefer to shift focus to colonised 
states versus non-colonised states. Yet, we believe the same reasoning holds stand 
with regards to the establishment of more sophisticated norms and political 
institutions in non-colonised countries. Hence, we argue that colonised states are 
immature in comparison with non-colonised states, for which they face higher 
monitoring and enforcement costs, which may eventually prevent them from adopting 
more mature CRM. 
 
Hypothesis 8: “The more the parties to a negotiated agreement have a history as 
colonised state, the higher the monitoring and enforcement costs, hence the more we 
expect them to adopt an immature form of CRM” 
 
 




- Mainly, the GREEN lines signify a lowering effect.  
For example: “the higher the level of trust, the lower the bargaining cost”  
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Or: “the higher the political costs, the lower the monitoring and enforcement costs” 
- The BLUE lines signify an elevating effect. 
For example: “The more parties are asymmetric in their adaptive capacity, the higher the bargaining 
costs” 
Or: “The higher the political costs, the more CRM adoption will be hindered” 
- RED represents the transaction costs 
 
 
